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Abstract. Why do EU member states have difficulty transposing directives? How are the policies 
specified in these directives transformed into national policy? In this paper I analyze the transposition 
of EU directives. Discussing the current literature on EU compliance I develop a new approach to 
understand how domestic actors shape policy implementing EU directives. In this policy-specific 
approach the outcome of transposition depends on the institutional arena in which decision making 
takes place and the interests of the domestic actors involved. These institutional arenas can vary from 
parliament to national ministries and agencies. Domestic actors are taken as policy-specific veto 
players. Their preferences may lead to two different responses to the requirements of a directive. First, 
they can stick to the directive and transpose it in a literal way. Deviations between the directive and 
national policy are kept to a minimum. Second, domestic actors can adopt a non-literal interpretation 
of the directive, leading to more substantial deviations within the boundaries allowed by the European 
Commission. Both responses are illustrated by two cases of decision making concerning EU directives, 
the tobacco products directive and the animal trade directive. The analysis shows that the policy-
specific approach proposed in this paper helps in understanding transposition. It clarifies how the 
splendid ambitions formulated in Brussels are transformed by national administrations.  
Introduction 
When the member states of the European Union (EU) agree on a new directive, this policy instrument 
has a long way to go before it is finally implemented.2 For directive to become ‘law in action’ the 
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member states first have to transpose it into their national law, before national or subnational 
administrations or agencies start applying these rules. Transposition is important since it forms a 
precondition for effective implementation of EU policy. Without proper transposition, a directive will 
not be fully integrated into the national legal order. This creates the risk that implementing agencies 
are not informed about the new rules from Brussels, or that they get caught between conflicting 
requirements of these rules and national law. 
 Most EU member states appear to have some difficulty in transposing EU directives despite their 
obligation to comply.3 This paper focuses on the important issue of transposition. Table 1 presents a 
recent overview of transposition based on Commission scoreboards. Even though the Stockholm 
European Council (2001) stressed the importance of full transposition and agreed that all member 
states have to reduce their transposition backlogs to less than 1.5% of the total number of directives in 
2002, 9 member states, including the largest ones, have not yet achieved this target. The average 
transposition backlog in the Union is 1.7% or 42 directives. France and Italy each has a backlog of 
2.6% (or 62 and 64 directives, respectively), while Germany has a backlog of 2.3% (or 54 directives). 
While the Commission data provides information on how many directives are not yet transposed, it 
does not indicate how long the transposition of these directives is delayed. This is supplemented by a 
recent study of Mastenbroek (2003: 384), who finds, based on a sample of directives to be transposed 
by the Netherlands, that transposition was delayed for 42% of the directives. The delays varied 
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between just a few days to up to 326 weeks (that is, more than 6 years) after the agreed deadline, while 
the average delay was about 50 weeks. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 Why do member states have difficulty transposing directives? How are the policies specified in 
these directives transformed into national policy? The current literature on the European Union 
suggests different answers to these questions, drawing on arguments from mainstream perspectives in 
political science and public administration (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Some argue that problems with 
transposition are the result of an institutional ‘mismatch’ between the goals and instruments proposed 
by the directive and the existing domestic norms and ideas about policy (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; 
Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Graver, 2002). This ‘mismatch’ requires some adaptation in the domestic 
area which sometimes does not take place leading to delay or misapplication of community law. 
Others point to domestic opposition to the implementation of the directive, which is based on different 
views among the decisive domestic actors about the preferred regulatory regime (Haverland, 1999, 
2000; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000). This may lead to delay of the implementation of the EU 
policy or adaptation of this policy to domestic preferences. 
 Empirical work, however, shows that neither distinct domestic norms nor resistance from 
‘institutional’ veto players seem to provide a sufficient answer. Extensive case-study research on 
transport directives (Héritier et al., 2001) and environmental directives (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; 
Knill and Lenschow, 2000: 256) shows no straightforward relationship between general, country-based 
or sector-wide characteristics and the performance of a member state in transposing and implementing 
EU directives. This finding is supplemented with comparative work on the implementation of the 
parental leave directive (Falkner et al., 2002), which calls into question the usefulness of ‘mismatch’ as 
an explanatory factor. Recent quantitative research demonstrates that variables related to potential 
 3
political conflict within the national political arena, such as the number of national legislative veto 
players, the number of parties in government and whether the national political system is a federal one, 
have limited value in explaining compliance with EU law (Giuliani, 2003a; Mbaye, 2001, 2003). 
 These findings bring up the question of why these mainstream approaches fail to explain the 
outcomes of transposition. Remarkably, most work draws on general characteristics of the national 
political and administrative arena in order to understand the domestic reaction to EU policy. 
Transposition is regarded as a national responsibility and seen as related to overall characteristics of 
the domestic political system. In most member states, however, the actual work of adapting and 
changing national law is performed within administrative bodies, including ministries (Rhodes, 1986; 
Page and Wouters, 1995). The extent to which this occurs is illustrated by Mastenbroek’s study (2003) 
of directives transposed in the Netherlands. In her sample of 241 directives, 19% required the adoption 
of a statutory law, while 81% were transposed through lower-level legal instruments.4 These processes 
are not uniformly organized, but consist of different patterns of consultation, coordination and decision 
making in which numerous domestic actors play a role. These may include governing parties, or the 
political parties in parliament, but when a directive is transposed through lower-level legal instruments 
parliament is not involved. The context of transposition is therefore policy-specific and not country- or 
even sector-specific as presumed in most of the current work. Concentrating on country-specific 
characteristics, many existing studies and especially the quantitative work mentioned before focus on 
the wrong explanatory variables. For this reason, they are not able to provide a sufficient explanation 
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of how member states adapt to EU policy and why they sometimes have great difficulty in doing this 
within a certain period of time.  
 In this paper I take a different perspective on transposition and develop a policy-specific approach. 
My approach, which is embedded in an institutionalist perspective on decision-making, assumes that 
outcomes are a result of both the institutional structure of the decision-making process and the interests 
of the actors involved (see, for instance, Shepsle, 1979, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981, 1995; 
Ostrom, 1986). As applied to the US Congress, part of the institutionalist literature suggests that tools 
such as decentralized information gathering, ex post sanctions and political appointments (McCubbins 
and Schwartz, 1984; Weingast and Moran, 1983, Weingast, 1984), carefully designed administrative 
procedures (McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987, 1989; Macey, 1992) and court 
review (Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992), ensure that the actions of administrative actors primarily reflect 
the preferences of the legislature. The approach taken in this paper, however, diverges from the strong 
principal-agent bent of this literature. Besides disregarding the existence of transaction costs which 
reduce the effectiveness of tools and hence administrative compliance to Congress (Moe, 1987; Horn, 
1995), a perspective based on one principal and one agent has limited applicability to the more 
complex and multi-layered decision-making process of the EU. In the EU context, at least two 
principals can be distinguished at the national level. On the one hand, national parliaments are the 
traditional principals for domestic legislative decision making. On the other hand, the executive 
branch—that is, cabinet ministers and the administration—are the real legislators when it comes to the 
making of European policy by means of intergovernmental bargaining in the Council of Ministers. 
They are part of the overarching European decision-making with which national actors, including 
parliament, need to comply. As a consequence, no clear cut principal-agent relationship exists in the 
national political arena: when it comes to EU decision making, national administrations and national 
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parliaments are on a more equal footing. Since national administrations are better informed on EU 
policy than national parliaments, and national parliaments need not to be involved in the transposition 
of directives in most European legal orders, this may even lead to administrative dominance in the 
national decision making on directives. 
 The approach builds on the notion of policy-specific veto players who formally or informally have 
the authority to block decision making. This notion differs from the one used by Tsebelis (1995), who 
primarily focuses on formal veto players in the national legislative process (Tsebelis, 2002: 19). These 
formal veto players are of limited value in understanding transposition since this process does not 
always result in new legislation. The approach taken here also contrasts with the notion of veto points 
(Immergut, 1992; Haverland, 1999, 2000, 2003: 212-4; Börzel and Risse, 2000: 7), which are defined 
as “points of strategic uncertainty that arise from the logic of the decision process itself” (Immergut, 
1992: 66), or as “stages in the decision-making process on which agreement is legally required for a 
policy change” (Haverland, 2000: 85). Veto points are crucial and potentially blocking stages in the 
political process, while veto players are actors who have the authority to block but may not want to use 
this possibility depending on their goals.  
 The framework elaborated in this paper employs insights from the spatial theory of voting (Enelow 
and Hinich, 1984; Hinich and Munger, 1997; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997) and the theory of sequential 
games (Kreps, 1990: 355-432). It points out that depending on their preferences, domestic actors may 
react differently to the requirement of transposing a directive. On the one hand, domestic actors could 
stick to the directive and transpose it in a literal way. Deviations between the directive and national 
policy are kept to a minimum. On the other hand, domestic actors could adopt a non-literal 
interpretation of the directive which is not challenged by the European Commission. Under these 
circumstances, the national policy that will be implemented differs from the directive as decided by the 
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Council of Ministers. The paper further discusses the conditions under which these two different 
responses are expected. 
 The analytical framework is applied to two cases of decision making concerning EU directives in 
the Netherlands, which illustrate the basic logic of the approach and show how it applies to different 
institutional settings.5 The first case is the transposition of the tobacco products directive, which 
regulates the presentation and sale of tobacco products. It illustrates decision making in a 
parliamentary context leading to a literal transposition of the directive. The second case is an example 
of transposition within a single ministry without the involvement of the government or parliament. It 
concerns the transposition of the animal trade directive, which aims to reduce the spread of contagious 
animal diseases. In this case the resulting national measures deviate from the EU directive by 
providing much stricter rules for the handling and transport of swine and cows. The case descriptions 
are based on official publications, including the proceedings of the Dutch parliament, as well as 
interviews with government officials. In concluding this paper, I turn to the recent discussion in the 
literature on EU compliance and discuss whether the concept of policy-specific veto players 
contributes to our understanding of transposition.  
Discussing transposition: towards a policy-specific approach 
Tallberg (2002: 609) distinguishes two different perspectives for understanding why member states 
sometimes do not, or not immediately, comply with EU law. The first perspective is the management 
approach, which suggests that insufficient administrative capacity, or the complexity of the legislative 
issues at hand, affects transposition. “Non-compliance, when it occurs, is not a result of deliberate 
decisions to violate treaties, but an effect of capacity limitations and rule ambiguity” (Tallberg, 2002: 
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613). Governments may lack the political ability to ensure the agreed commitments or the support of 
the implementing administration. Interestingly, in this approach governments as well as their 
administrations are regarded as unitary actors who are faced with political, legal or administrative 
limitations in their capacity to act and implement the acquis.  
 It is not clear in the context of the management approach whether certain ‘limitations’ in the 
implementation of directives are the unintended consequence of differences in views between member 
states. For this purpose Tallberg (2002: 611) introduces the enforcement approach which regards non-
compliance as a ‘choice’ of a member state resulting from a difference between an international 
obligation and its interests. To achieve compliance, an international obligation has to be ‘enforced’ so 
that the state changes its ‘choice’. Focusing on the differences between unitary states, the question 
arises whether this perspective is helpful in understanding transposition and compliance as a national 
or domestic decision-making process. However, both the enforcement and the management approach 
ignore the fact that national positions are the result of the interactions of different national actors, each 
having their own interests. To understand why member states have difficulty accepting EU directives 
and adapting their laws, one has to move away from a single-actor perspective and adopt a perspective 
that takes into account multiple actors in the domestic political arena interacting in a multilevel 
perspective of EU politics (Marks et al., 1996). 
 Another perspective in the existing literature focuses on the domestic area in its explanation. Delays 
in transposition are regarded as a result of an institutional ‘misfit’ between existing domestic 
institutions, in particular the norms and ideas about policy, and the directive (Knill, 1998; Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Graver, 2002). However, the ‘misfit’-approach comes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5  See Andeweg and Irwin (1993) and Smith (1976) for more information on the Dutch political 
system. See Kooiman et al. (1988) and Bekkers et al. (1995) for earlier work on transposition in the 
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has some limitations. First, there are conceptual difficulties with what ‘misfit’ actually entails, since it 
may refer to “mismatch between EU measures and domestic institutions, policy instruments, standards 
and problem-solving approaches” in either qualitative or quantitative nature (Falkner et al, 2004: 467). 
In addition, based on empirical research, it appears that ‘misfit’ on its own is not sufficient to explain 
substantial variations in transposition (Knill and Lenschow, 2000: 256; Héritier et al. 2001; Falkner et 
al. 2005). Héritier et al. (2001) also explored ‘misfit’ but went further by developing this concept as 
part of an approach focusing on both actors and ideas. This approach defines the existing ‘reform state’ 
as a starting point from which political actors may either resist or change policy influenced by 
dominant policy ideas. Falkner et al. (2002: 29) also suggest such an approach “…which takes into 
account both institutional and actor-based factors.” 
 This brings me to the last perspective on transposition. The actor- or interest-based approach 
focuses on the domestic decision-making structure and the way in which the preferences of political 
and administrative actors affect outcomes. Non-compliance is regarded as the unintended consequence 
of the differences in interests between these actors. Sometimes domestic actors may resist the 
introduction of new national law, which causes delay (Héritier, 1999: 14-6). In other instances, they 
may have a joint-interest in deviating from the policy specified in the directive leading to ‘legislative’ 
or ‘bureaucratic’ drift as part of the transposition process (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000). A reason 
why some domestic actors prefer these shifts is that they did not participate in the EU legislative 
process. Consequently, as Mény et al. (1996: 7) point out, “national actors responsible for 
implementation may be tempted to claw back what they lost at the summit.” The question is whether 
they will succeed in doing so. 
 Within the actor-based approach differences occur concerning which domestic actors are involved 
in transposition. Mbaye (2001, 2003) and Giuliani (2003a) take a legalistic perspective by assuming 
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that decisions on transposition are typically made by national legislative actors including parliament. 
This view disregards the fact that the transposition and the implementation of directives is mostly in 
the hands of lower-level actors. Transposition is not a uniform process involving the same political 
actors for all directives but rather one that depends on the policy involved. In this paper I take a policy-
specific perspective on domestic actors. Depending on the institutional characteristics of the policy 
process involved, different political and administrative actors will be involved. The question is how 
there actors will adapt their domestic law to the Union’s acquis.  
Explaining transposition 
Based on the perspective that transposition is affected by domestic interests, I approach transposition 
as a process in which at least two (political or administrative) actors have to approve a proposal that 
converts a directive into national law. These actors could be coalition parties in government, political 
parties in parliament, national ministries, implementing agencies, or any other political actor who, 
depending on the policy sector and the procedure that is used, plays a role in the decision-making 
process.  
 The need to reach agreement on the implementing instrument is represented in terms of veto power 
for each of the participating actors. In contrast to other decision-making processes like national 
lawmaking where the state of affairs or status quo is the current policy, the transposition process starts 
from the new EU directive. The directive is the starting point for the making of national law, but it 
may allow or require additional interpretation. Variation in transposition depends on the content of a 
directive, but it is more common than usually assumed.6 It may comprise the choice of different 
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options provided by the directive, the way in which specific targets are achieved, the arrangements 
concerning the implementation and enforcement of the national regulations, and the interpretation of 
ambiguous parts. If all players agree on the transposition proposal specifying how to include the 
contents of the directive into national law, the directive is implemented according to this ‘national’ 
interpretation of its contents. If these players disagree for whatever reason and cannot adopt an 
interpretation of the directive, they are forced to stick to the directive’s actual wording. 
 These two different possibilities can be illustrated by assuming that political and administrative 
actors have single-peaked, spatial preferences. Each actor prefers a specific and unique policy, which 
is called a player’s most preferred position or ideal point. Moreover, the further away an alternative 
policy is from this ideal point, the less it is preferred. I label the ideal point for veto player i as Vi. 
 As indicated, implementation is monitored by the European Commission. The Commission may 
challenge a member state for failing to transpose a directive, or for transposing the directive in such a 
way that the content of the national regulations does not match the content of the directive. However, 
monitoring and enforcing the implementation of directives is costly. These costs, which depend on the 
contents of the directive involved, shape the Commission’s response to deviations. The Commission 
will challenge a national government when the difference between the original directive and national 
law is such that it exceeds the costs of enforcement. The Commission as the ‘guardian of the treaties’ 
is presumed to have an ideal point that corresponds to the policy specified in the directive. 
 National governments, national political groups and organized interests are well aware of the 
Commission’s monitoring role. They want to avoid being challenged by the Commission. If the 
Commission challenges them, they will lose face domestically as well as internationally. Furthermore, 
if the Commission findings are supported by the European Court of Justice, the domestic decision will 
be reversed and domestic actors will be confronted with severe sanctions. This means that there are 
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some costs involved when undesirable deviations from the directive are detected by the Commission, 
which reduces the payoffs to domestic actors.7 We can now define a set of proposals that will not be 
challenged by the Commission, which I call the set of sustainable proposals. In view of the 
impossibility of perfect Commission oversight8, this set includes all points between dmin and dmax in 
Figure 1, with d as the policy specified in the directive. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Which policy will be preferred by the veto players? When the veto players engage in a decision-
making process over a new policy, the first issue is whether both prefer some alternative to the initial 
content of the directive. The existence of these policies, which I call jointly preferred policies, depends 
on the location of the directive vis-à-vis the preferred positions of both players. In the case of the 
preference configuration presented in Figure 1, the directive is located between both players. This 
makes it impossible for the players to suggest an alternative that is preferred by both. A change in the 
content of the directive to the right will be opposed by the first player, while the second player will 
oppose any change in content to the left. In other words, under the circumstances presented here, 
neither player can engage in bargaining and thus they will transpose the directive in a literal way. This 
general result can be presented as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: If the policy specified in a directive is located between the most preferred 
positions of domestic veto players, the directive is transposed in a literal way.9 
The situation as envisaged in this hypothesis can also be associated with delay in the process of 
transposition. As different veto players prefer changes into opposing directions, they may hinder a 
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swift decision-making process. Some may postpone their decision to the very last moment, while 
others try to resolve the existing deadlock by redefining the issues at stake, by adding new issues, 
linking the issues with other decision-making processes, or trying to change the preferences of the 
opponents (Héritier, 1999: 16-7). If not successful, opposing preferences result into a literal 
transposition of the directive.10 
 The result of hypothesis 1 is based on the sufficient condition that the directive is located between 
the preferred positions of the veto players. If veto players are found at different locations so that this 
condition is not satisfied, deviations may occur. This leads to the following corollary: 
Corollary: If the policy specified in a directive is not located between the most preferred 
positions of domestic veto players, these players may propose an interpretation of the directive. 
In contrast to hypothesis 1, the location of the veto players is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. 
This requires a further exploration of the circumstances under which players are able to interpret the 
directive differently. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 A situation that differs from the one discussed occurs if the veto players have preferences as 
displayed in Figure 2. In this configuration, both players prefer a change in the directive to the right, 
which implies that some alternative and preferred policy options exist. To determine the range of these 
alternatives, it is important to identify the points that, in utility terms, are equivalent to the original 
directive to both veto players 1 and 2. Based on the single-peaked preference functions of both 
groups—for which the top of the utility function is equivalent to the indicated most preferred 
position—these points, which are called indifference points, are 1(d) and 2(d) in the figure. All points 
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between d and the indifference points form the set of alternatives that are preferred by these players. 
Since veto player 1 prefers the smaller deviation from the directive than veto player 2, 1’s set of 
preferred points is smaller and thus more restrictive than 2’s. The set of jointly preferred policies is the 
intersection of both sets of individually preferred points and is equal to the interval between d and 1(d), 
as indicated in Figure 2. 
 In making a choice, the sets of sustainable and jointly preferred alternatives play a role. If one of the 
players selects a policy that is not part of both sets, the proposal will be rejected by the other player, 
since it is not supported politically, and/or rejected by the Commission, leading to infringements. In 
any event, a proposal to transpose the directive differently will fail since it lacks sufficient political 
support. However, if a proposal is part of both sets, i.e. found in their intersection, support exists for an 
alternative interpretation of the directive. In other words, the possibility exists that the proposed 
national law includes a different interpretation of the directive’s contents. These possibilities are found 
in the set of feasible policies, which includes all alternatives between d and dmax in Figure 2. Given 
these options, the next question is which policy will be selected. 
 To answer this question, I focus on the sequence of the decision-making process. As in many real 
world decision-making situations one of the veto players has the authority to make the initial proposal, 
which is subsequently discussed with the other player in the game. The veto player with this authority 
is called the agenda setter. With regard to the two players in our example, I assume that veto player 1 
has the possibility to make the initial proposal on how to transpose the directive, while player 2 can 
only accept or reject the proposal. The sequence of play in this game is as follows: in the first stage, 
player 1 decides on an interpretation of the directive, which is submitted to the other veto players. In 
the second stage, all veto players decide to accept or reject the interpretation. In this case, player 2 has 
to decide whether to use his or her veto, next to player 1. If the interpretation is rejected, the directive 
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will be transposed in a literal way. If the proposal is accepted, the new interpretation will become 
national law and is the way in which the government seeks to comply with EU law. Finally, the 
Commission decides whether or not the interpretation is sustainable. If not, the government’s decision 
will be (eventually) reversed, which can be expressed by an additional reduction of utility to each of 
the national players. Transposition, in this model, is the result of a three-stage game of perfect and 
complete information in which veto player 1 moves first. 
 The solution of this sequential game can be illustrated with the preferences presented in Figure 2. 
Starting with the last stage, the set of sustainable interpretations can be determined based on the 
contents of the directive and the Commission’s ability to ‘protect’ the directive against alternative 
interpretations. The sustainable interpretations are all points between dmin and dmax. In the second stage, 
the veto players have to decide whether to veto an interpretation. Alternatives that are part of the veto 
players’ win set will be preferred and thus not be vetoed. These alternatives are located in the area 
where the preference set of player 2 overlaps with player 1’s preference set with regard to the 
directive. In other words, all interpretations between the original directive d and player 1’s point of 
indifference 1(d) are part of this set. Based on this consideration, player 1 seeks his or her best 
interpretation of the directive that is sustainable and preferred. Points that have both characteristics are 
located in the intersection of the two sets. In other words, player 1 can choose an interpretation from 
the points that are, in this case, located between d and dmax. Since these points include player 1’s ideal 
position, this player chooses this point as the new, national interpretation of the directive. 
 Choosing interpretation S as the interpretation of the directive, player 2 will accept it and thus 
refrain from using his or her veto. In addition, the Commission will not challenge the member state, 
since the interpretation of the directive is within the set of sustainable interpretations. This 
combination of strategies is the Nash equilibrium of this game based on the preference configuration in 
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Figure 2. The equilibrium outcome is interpretation S.  
 This result, which holds for a broader range of different preferences, forms the basis of the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2-A: Domestic veto players adopt an interpretation that is equivalent to the most 
preferred position of the agenda setter if 
(a) the policy specified in a directive is not located between the most preferred positions of the 
veto players, and  
(b) the agenda setter has a moderate preference compared to the other veto players that is part 
of the set of feasible policies. 
Note that this result depends on four necessary conditions concerning the existence and location of the 
various veto players, including the agenda setter. Concerning the agenda setter—player 1 in the 
example—two things are important: first, the agenda setter must have an ideal position in the set of 
feasible policies; second, the agenda setter has to have a moderate preference—i.e. a preference closer 
to the location of the directive, d—than any of the other veto players. If these conditions are not 
satisfied, the result as expressed in Hypothesis 2-A does not hold.  
 Modifying the conditions concerning the location of the agenda setter, the following result applies, 
which is the mirror of the previous hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2-B: Domestic veto players adopt an interpretation that is equivalent to a feasible 
policy closest to the most preferred position of the agenda setter if 
(a) the policy specified in a directive is not located between the most preferred positions of veto 
players, and 
(b) the agenda setter does not have a moderate preference compared to the other veto players or 
this player’s most preferred position is not part of the set of feasible policies. 
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This result is illustrated by the preference configuration in Figure 3 in which the veto players changed 
preferences. Now the first player, who is also the agenda setter, has a more extreme position with 
regard to the directive, d, than veto player 2. In this case, the agenda setter is no longer able to propose 
an interpretation of the directive that is equivalent to his or her own ideal position G1. The best 
interpretation that is both feasible and acceptable to the other veto player is the one equivalent to point 
dmax. The agenda setter, making his or her choice in the first stage of the game, will propose this point 
as the interpretation of the directive. This policy will be approved by the second veto player and does 
not trigger a reply by the Commission. It forms the equilibrium outcome. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 Both hypotheses indicate that domestic players may deviate from the directive, but that the potential 
for such deviations is limited. As discussed earlier, directives allow for some freedom of 
implementation. The possibility of domestic actors to adopt an interpretation that differs from the 
wording of the directive is specified by the set of feasible policies. First, this set depends on the 
Commission’s willingness and ability to control transposition. However, control is costly so that even 
if the Commission could determine what the proper way of transposing a directive is, it cannot control 
all possible deviations from the directive’s content. In addition, the policies specified in directives 
often vary in terms of how specific they are formulated affecting Commission abilities. A general 
obligation to member states to support the equal treatment of men and women leaves more discretion 
to member states than specific requirements ruling out any differences between men and women 
including those with regard to pay, social benefits, and pensions. Second, the set of feasible policies is 
shaped by the preferences of the domestic veto players. Only if these players jointly prefer a change in 
the contents of the directive will it result in an interpretation of the directive. Making such 
interpretations is an inherent part of the process of transposition since directives are the result of 
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political negotiations in the Union’s legislative process. 
 Having formulated some hypotheses based on my policy-specific approach to transposition, the 
next step is to apply them to actual decision-making processes in the Dutch domestic arena. The first 
case is the tobacco products directive, which required the introduction of new legislation involving the 
national parliament. The second one is the directive on animal trade, which was transposed by 
administrative actors within the ministry of agriculture. 
Tobacco products 
On 5 June 2001 the Council adopted, together with the European Parliament, a directive on the 
manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products.11 This directive, which was proposed by the 
European Commission in November 1999, sets uniform standards for the maximum tar, nicotine and 
carbon monoxide yields of cigarettes, which have to be tested on an annual basis. Furthermore, the 
directive requires that unit packets of tobacco products carry a general health warning (for instance 
‘smoking kills’) as well as information on the ingredients. According to the directive (Article 14), the 
member states had to comply with these new rules by 30 September 2002 at the latest. In addition, the 
directive provides for a longer sales period for cigarettes (one year) and other tobacco products (two 
years) after the transposition deadline in order to allow the industry to sell existing stocks.  
 The Dutch government supported most changes proposed by the Commission. In the information 
sheet which the government sent to Parliament, the government observed that reducing smoking would 
lead to a reduction in illness and mortality. It also indicated that the new directive was expected to be 
                                                     
11  Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products, published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities L194 (18.7.2001): 26-34. 
 18
transposed swiftly.12 During the negotiations, the Dutch held an intermediate position concerning the 
banning of certain terms as well as the size of the health warning on packets and the extent to which 
the industry must disclose information on ingredients. In view of the preferences of other member 
states as well as the position taken by the European Parliament, the resulting directive took a strong 
stand against possible misleading terms, the size of the health warning and the obligation to disclose 
information on ingredients that are mentioned on a common list (Arregui, 2004: 52-6). 
 The tobacco products directive was transposed in the Netherlands using five different legal 
instruments. The most important one is an amendment of the Tobacco Law. This amendment, which 
was introduced to Parliament on 29 May 2002, included new definitions of tobacco products, tar and 
nicotine, the requirement for manufacturers and importers to provide information on the ingredients of 
tobacco products, the verification and disclosure of this information, and a ban on descriptions 
suggesting that a particular tobacco product was less harmful than others. The proposal was adopted by 
Parliament in January 2003 and came into force on 18 April 2003.13 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 In addition to this change in the Tobacco Law, four lower-level legal instruments were used, which 
are included in Figure 4: 
- an order in council amending existing decisions on the tar yield of cigarettes and the labeling of 
tobacco products. A draft version of this order in council was presented to Parliament and published in 
                                                     
12  See the Letter of the state secretary of Foreign Affairs of 28 February 2000, TK 1999-2000, 22.112, 
no. 147: 4-5. 
13  See Decision of 4 April 2003 to determine the moment at which the Law of 6 February 2003 comes 
into force, Staatsblad 2003(155). The new law is published as: Law of 6 February 2003 to adapt the 
Tobacco Law to directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 
on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products (OJ L 194), Staatsblad 
2003(89). The parliamentary discussions leading to this law can be found under the dossier number 
28.401. 
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the Government Gazette (Staatscourant) in order to allow Parliament as well as industry to respond to 
the proposed measures.14 After these consultations, the initial proposal was changed by making a 
separate proposal for hand-rolling tobacco.15 In contrast to the directive, the government preferred to 
apply the same (and thus higher) standards to this product as cigarettes. The new decision came into 
force in May 2002;16 
- two separate ministerial decrees. The first one dealt with measurement methods for tar, nicotine and 
carbon monoxide. This decree, based on the previous decisions on the labeling of tobacco products and 
the tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide yield in cigarettes, implemented the requirements on maximum 
yields of cigarettes and the labeling of packets. The decree was adopted shortly after the consultations 
that led to the new decisions on yield and labeling of tobacco products.17 The second decree regulated 
the way in which industry had to provide information on the ingredients of tobacco products. This 
decree elaborated the new regime as introduced by the new Tobacco Law and came into force after the 
adoption of the new law in April 2003;18 and, finally, 
                                                     
14  Draft-change of the Decision tar yield cigarettes (Besluit teergehalte sigaretten) and the Decision 
labeling tobacco products (Aanduidingsbesluit tabaksproducten), Staatscourant 2001 (26: 6 February): 
19; and Draft-change of the Decision tar yield cigarettes (Besluit teergehalte sigaretten) and the 
Decision labeling tobacco products (Aanduidingsbesluit tabaksproducten), Staatscourant 2001 (135: 
17 July): 13. 
15  Decision of 21 January 2002 amending the Decision tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide yield in 
cigarettes (Besluit maximumgehaltes aan teer, nicotine en koolmonoxide in sigaretten) and the 
Decision labeling tobacco products (Aanduidingsbesluit tabaksproducten), Staatsblad 2002(84). 
16  See the Decision of 21 January 2002 amending the Decision tar yield cigarettes (Besluit teergehalte 
sigaretten) and the Decision labeling tobacco products (Aanduidingsbesluit tabaksproducten), 
Staatsblad 2002(83). 
17  Ministerial Decree on measurement methods on tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide of cigarettes and 
hand-rolling tobacco (Regeling methoden van onderzoek ten aanzien van teer-, nicotine- en 
koolmonoxidegehaltes in sigaretten en shag), Staatscourant 2002 (78: 23 April): 11. 
18  Ministerial Decree on list of ingredients of tobacco products (Regeling lijsten tabaksingrediënten), 
Staatscourant 2003 (79: 24 April): 18. 
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- an order in council to implement ways to enforce the new regulations on labeling, yield and product 
information of tobacco products. This decision came into force on 1 September 2003.19  
 The coming into force of this decision on enforcement can be regarded as the last step in the process 
of transposing Directive 2001/37/EC. The Dutch government was almost one year late in 
implementing this directive. This delay was partly due to the late submission of the bill amending the 
Tobacco Law to the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament at the end of May 2002. The 
amendment was submitted 10 months after the official publication of the directive and only four 
months before the deadline. As an official commented, it was “due to the simultaneous overhaul of the 
Tobacco Law based on national priorities, which required substantial effort of the ministry.” When the 
proposal was presented to parliament, the minister of Health, Welfare and Sport stressed the urgency 
of passing the bill in view of the deadline.20 Nevertheless, the parliamentary discussions lasted until 28 
January 2003 when the First Chamber voted in favor of the bill.  
 A second factor influencing the delay is the unexpected changes in government during the period in 
which the transposition of the directive was prepared. The preparations for transposition, including the 
drafting of the changes in the Tobacco Law and its introduction to Parliament, were made under the 
responsibility of the minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, Els Borst. As a member of D66, she was a 
minister in the second ‘purple’ cabinet in the Netherlands.21 After the unexpected fall of the 
government and the early elections in May 2002, her responsibility for this dossier was taken over by 
the new minister Eduard Bomhoff in July 2002. He was a member of the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the 
                                                     
19  Decision of 13 May 2003 amending the Appendix of the Tobacco Law, Staatsblad 2003(222). 
20  See the Explanatory memorandum to the changes of the Tobacco Law, TK 2001-2002, 28.301, no. 
3: 5. 
21  Cabinet Kok II, which governed from August 1998 until July 2002. The coalition parties in this 
cabinet were Labor Party (PvdA), the Liberals (VVD), and Democrats 1966 (D66). This cabinet 
resigned on 16 April 2002 after the publication of a critical evaluation of the government’s handling of 
the Screbrenica-crisis. 
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newly formed Balkenende cabinet.22 Bomhoff defended the draft law in the Second Chamber in 
Parliament. Disagreement within the LPF led to the fall of the cabinet and the resignation of Bomhoff 
in October 2002. The next state secretary of Health, Welfare and Sport, Clémence Ross-van Dorp 
(Christian Democrats), became responsible for the changes in the Tobacco law. She discussed the 
proposal with the First Chamber in Parliament as a member of the Balkenende I-cabinet, and finalized 
the transposition of the tobacco products directive in June 2003 as part of the newly formed 
Balkenende II-cabinet.23  
 The relevant veto players in the transposition process of this directive are the coalition parties and 
the minister of Health, Welfare and Sport. Due to the already mentioned changes in government, two 
different governing coalitions and preference configurations are relevant:  
- the coalition between the Labor Party, the Liberals and D66 as part of the Kok II-cabinet: these 
parties played a role in the period of the drafting of the new Tobacco Law; and 
- the coalition between the Christian Democrats, LPF and Liberals as part of the Balkenende I-
cabinet: these parties played a role in the period of discussing and approving the bill in Parliament. 
The minister and later the state secretary of Health, Welfare and Sport can be regarded as the agenda 
setter in the process. In the Dutch political system ministers are individually responsible for their 
policies, meaning that they have to defend their policies in Parliament. Ministers may also deviate 
from views of parliament as long as a majority—and de facto one of the political parties supporting the 
government—does not lose its confidence in the minister. 
                                                     
22  Cabinet Balkenende I, which governed from July 2002 until May 2003. This cabinet was supported 
by a coalition of the Christian Democrats (CDA), the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), and the Liberals (VVD). 
23  After the fall of the Balkenende I-cabinet in October 2002, new elections were held in January 
2003. Based on these results the cabinet Balkenende II was formed, which started in May 2003. This 
cabinet is supported by a coalition of the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Liberals (VVD), and the 
Democrats (D66). 
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 The main issue that was brought up during the parliamentary discussion of the bill concerned the 
interpretation of the regulations about the packaging of tobacco products. Article 7 of the directive 
indicates that “…texts, names, trade marks and figurative or other signs suggesting that a particular 
tobacco product is less harmful than others shall not be used on the packaging of tobacco products.”24 
Terms such as ‘other signs’ and ‘suggesting’ allow for some leeway about how restrictive this article 
has to be interpreted. At the same time, as one of the considerations in the directive indicates, member 
states “should be able to adopt more stringent rules concerning tobacco products which they deem 
necessary to protect public health”.25 Within certain limits, the directive allows for more restrictive 
national law. These two elements suggest that member states, in principle, could adopt different 
interpretations of the prohibition of tobacco packaging. It also suggests that the European Commission 
will have difficulty in challenging any deviation from the literal text of the directive, which leaves 
some scope for alternative views in national law. In other words, a set of sustainable proposals exists. 
This set, which is skewed towards more restrictive rules, is illustrated in Figure 5.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
 The responsible minister in the Kok II-cabinet, Borst (D66), took a restrictive stand on this issue, 
despite the fact that during the negotiations the Dutch team favored less restrictive rules (Arregui, 
2004: 39-40). The minister indicated in the explanatory memorandum of the bill that ‘lighter color 
schemes’ compared to the colors used for the packaging of non-‘light’ tobacco products of the same 
                                                     
24  Initially, the Dutch version of Directive 2001/37/EC did not include the addition of ‘or other signs’ 
after ‘figurative’ in the wording of Article 7. The minister mentioned this at the beginning of the 
parliamentary discussion of the bill and indicated that this was due to a translation error (Explanatory 
memorandum to the changes of the Tobacco Law, TK 2001-2002, 28.301, no. 3: 8). This addition was 
included in the English, French and German versions of the directive. Since the negotiations on the 
directive were done in English, the state secretary felt that this text should be followed; see: 
Handelingen Eerste Kamer 2002-2003, no. 13 (17 December 2002): 415. The Dutch version of the 
directive has been changed by the Rectification of 26 February 2003, published in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities No. L 51 (26.2.2003): 23. 
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brand were not allowed.26 During the first phase of the parliamentary discussion in the standing 
committee on Health, Welfare and Sport, this view was supported by the coalition partners in the Kok 
II-cabinet. The Labor Party and the Liberal Party had no comments on the proposal, while D66 only 
pointed to the additional costs to the industry introducing the changes in packaging.27 The preferences 
of the players, which were part of the Kok II-cabinet, are summarized in Figure 5-A. 
 The situation changed with the new government in the summer of 2003. During the plenary 
discussions in Parliament in September, the speaker of the Liberal Party, Geert Wilders, took a less 
restrictive view and suggested that the law should not prohibit the use of different color schemes at all. 
He proposed to explicitly exclude from the prohibition in the law “the use of different color fields” on 
the packaging of tobacco products.28 This view came as a surprise to most of the other speakers, since 
the Liberal Party did not reveal this preference earlier in the discussions. They took this sudden change 
in the position of the Liberal Party to be a result of a successful intervention by the tobacco industry. 
The less restrictive position of the Liberals was supported by the Christian Democrats and the LPF, the 
other coalition parties in the newly formed Balkenende I-cabinet. The minister of Health, Welfare and 
Sport in this cabinet, Bomhoff, held an outspoken view against smoking and in favor of discouraging 
the use of tobacco products. As one official commented, “Bomhoff was known to be a teetotaler and 
was in favor of prohibiting smoking as much as possible.” His position may not have been as extreme 
as his predecessor, minister Borst, but he did not share the views of the Liberals, the Christian 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25  See consideration 24 of the tobacco products directive. 
26  See Explanatory memorandum to the changes of the Tobacco Law, TK 2001-2002, 28.401, no. 3: 
8). 
27  See Report on the parliamentary discussions of the standing committee on Health, Welfare and 
Sport, TK 2001-2002, 28.401, no. 4: 1-2. 
28  See the amendment proposed by Wilders and others of 19 September 2002, TK 2002-2003, 28.401, 
no. 7. 
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Democrats and his own party, the loosely organized LPF.29 His preference is therefore located to the 
right of the directive in Figure 5-B. 
 The preference configuration for the Kok II-cabinet (Figure 5-A) satisfies the conditions mentioned 
in Hypothesis 2-B. The Liberals and D66 did not object to a more restrictive prohibition on tobacco 
packaging, while the minister and the Labor Party favored the most restrictive regime. Based on this 
configuration, the hypothesis predicts that minister Borst as the agenda setter would have been able to 
pass the proposal successfully, which was close to her ideal position (that is, policy S in Figure 5-A). 
However, the new elections that resulted in the victory for the LPF and the subsequent change in 
government, made it impossible to test this expectation empirically.  
 The preference configuration for the Balkenende I-cabinet (Figure 5-B) satisfies the conditions 
mentioned in Hypothesis 1. The Liberals, Christian Democrats and the LPF advocated a less restrictive 
prohibition, while the minister preferred a regime comparable, or perhaps even more restrictive than 
the directive. In this instance, the hypothesis predicts that the outcome is a literal interpretation of the 
directive. No deviation from the text of the directive is expected to occur.  
 On 6 February 2003 the amended Tobacco Law was adopted, which included the following new 
article: “Starting from 30 September 2003 it is forbidden to use texts, names, trade marks and 
figurative or other signs on the packaging of tobacco products which suggest that a particular tobacco 
product is less harmful than others.”30 This prohibition is a literal rendering of the text of Article 7 in 
the directive. Moreover, the more restrictive interpretation of minister Borst in the explanatory 
memorandum of the bill concerning the limited use of different colors on the packaging of tobacco 
                                                     
29  See Bomhoff’s reply to Parliament, Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2002-2003, no. 6 (26 September 
2002): 354. 
30 See Article I(D) of the Law of 6 February 2003 to adapt the Tobacco Law to directive 2001/37/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, 
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products31, was no longer supported by minister Bomhoff. This position as well as the text of the new 
law confirms the prediction made on the basis of Hypothesis 1. The literal transposition of the tobacco 
products directive is in line with the policy-specific framework developed in this paper. 
 The change of the interpretation of the directive was triggered by the amendment introduced by the 
Liberal Party Member of Parliament Wilders. With the support of the Christian Democrats and the 
LPF, Wilders introduced an amendment of the bill to exclude the use of color fields from the 
prohibition. At the time of the discussion, these parties formed the governing coalition and held a 
majority in Parliament. During the discussion of the bill in Parliament, minister Bomhoff indicated that 
he did not want to modify the bill in view of the amendment. In his opinion, the amendment was “not 
necessary, or in conflict with the EU directive”. At the same time, Bomhoff stressed that he did not 
want to introduce a more restrictive regime on color schemes since “there are more effective ways to 
discourage smoking.”32 Wilders withdrew his amendment when Bomhoff confirmed that after the 
introduction of the law differences in color schemes would be still possible.33 With this statement, the 
more restrictive view, proposed by Borst in the explanatory memorandum, was no longer authoritative. 
 In line with the suggestion of Giuliani (2003a), Treib (2003) and others, the national legislative 
actors are the relevant veto players in this case. However, the case also shows that the number of veto 
players involved did not affect the content of the national measures transposing the directive. Using a 
formal or legalistic perspective, there were four veto players active in the period of the Balkenende I-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, 
presentation and sale of tobacco products (OJ L 194), Staatsblad 2003(89). 
31  The idea was that the more restrictive statement in the explanatory memorandum of the bill would 
be used in interpreting the new law during implementation as well as future court cases. In this way, 
the memorandum clarified the policy transposing the directive.  
32  Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2002-2003, no. 6 (26 September 2002): 354. 
33  Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2002-2003, no. 6 (26 September 2002): 355. 
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cabinet (see Figure 5-B), who are expected to hinder the making of a decision (Börzel and Risse, 
2000:7). Still, the domestic players changed the law and transposed the directive literally. 
Animal trade 
The second case concerns Directive 97/12/EC on animal trade adopted by the Agricultural Council on 
17 March 1997. This directive amends Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems, which 
affects the trade of cows and swine in the European Union.34 New elements in the amended Directive 
64/432/EEC are standards to avoid contamination of cattle in assembly centers and on markets (Article 
11), the registration of animal transport and additional sanitary standards for transport (Article 12), and 
the registration of animal dealers and standards for the areas where the animals are kept before they are 
transported to other EU member states (Article 13). The directive also allows for the introduction of an 
optional system of surveillance networks for animal holdings (Article 14). Although the Commission 
wished for introducing an obligatory network in order to establish a level playing field in Europe for 
bovine animals and swine, it was not a realistic goal at that time in view of the existing state of affairs 
in various member states. All these measures aimed at preventing the spread of contagious animal 
diseases. According to the directive, the new rules should have been be applied by the member states 
before 1 July 1998, that is, about one year after the passage of legislation. However, this period of one 
year turned out to be too short for most of the member states, specifically with regard to setting up the 
required checks and monitoring of contagious animal diseases in the field. Directive 98/99/EC 
therefore postponed by one year the deadline for complying with the new rules until 1 July 1999.35  
                                                     
34  Council Directive 97/12/EC of 17 March 1997 amending and updating Directive 64/432/EEC on 
health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine, Official Journal of the 
European Communities No. L109 (25.4.97). 
35  Council Directive 98/99/EC of 14 December 1998 amending Directive 97/12/EG amending and 
updating Directive 64/432/EEC on health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals 
and swine, Official Journal of the European Communities No. L358 (31.12.98). 
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 The Dutch government has been quite aware of the dangers of various contagious animal diseases, 
including swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease. Especially the outbreaks of swine fever in 1980 and 
1992 had a huge impact on the agricultural sector and led to substantial financial losses. Already as 
early as 1993, the Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries responded to these 
problems with several policy measures reducing the risks of the transmission of diseases by setting 
sanitary standards for the areas where swine is kept and the conditions under which these animals were 
handled by dealers and transporters. In subsequent years these rules were further extended with regard 
to the keeping and transport of swine. The strong focus on animal transport was partly due to the 
suspicion that animals were mostly infected at shipment stations where they were brought together for 
transport.  
 When the Netherlands faced yet another outbreak of swine fever at the beginning of 1997, it was 
holding the Presidency of the EU. The urge to avoid further spread of the disease caused by conditions 
in international animal transport provided a strong incentive to propose more rigorous regulation at the 
EU level. Interestingly, the new directive requires the registration of dealers and sets sanitary standards 
for the handling, transport and market places of animals much along the lines of existing Dutch law. At 
the same time, there are important differences as well. First, the directive applies to trade and transport 
between EU member states, while there were already strict rules in force for the transport and handling 
of animals within the Netherlands. Second, the directive provides the same regulatory regime for swine 
and cows, while in view of the recent outbreak of swine fever the domestic rules for handling and 
transporting swine were much stricter than for cows. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 The transposition of Articles 11, 12 and 13 of Directive 97/12/EC in the Netherlands is summarized 
in Figure 6. Based on existing Health and Welfare Law for Animals, the Minister of Agriculture, 
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Nature Management and Fisheries could transpose the relevant elements of the new directive into 
secondary legislation. The new rules concerning the bringing together of swine in assembly centers 
were included in the new decree amending the regulation on the grouping of animals and the 
regulation on the trade in live animals and live products.36 The decree amending the regulation of the 
trade in live animals and live products provided less strict rules for the bringing together, handling and 
transport of cows as it only applied to trade between EU member states.37 Finally, the decree amending 
the regulation on sanitary requirements concerning contagious animal diseases provided the necessary 
standards with regard to the transport of animals.38 Based on the adoption of the third decree, the three 
articles of the directive were transposed on 6 July 1999, a little over two years after the adoption of the 
directive and only a few days after the official deadline. 
 The transposition of Directive 97/12/EC in the Netherlands is an example of transposition within a 
single ministry in which the government or Parliament did not play a role. The process was handled by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries.39 Within this ministry two departments 
were important: the central legal department (Department of Legal Affairs), which was responsible for 
transposing the directive, and the policy department that prepared the Dutch position during the 
preparation of the directive and was involved in the negotiations at the EU level (Department of 
                                                     
36  Ministerial Decree amending the Regulation on the grouping of animals and the Regulation on the 
trade in live animals and live products (Wijziging Regeling bijeenbrengen van dieren en Regeling 
handel levende dieren en levende producten) of 29 July 1998, Staatscourant 1998 (148: 7 August): 10. 
37  Ministerial Decree amending the Regulation on the trade in live animals and live products 
(Wijziging Regeling handel in levende dieren en levende producten) of 28 June 1999, Staatscourant 
1999 (122: 30 June): 14. 
38  Ministerial Decree amending the Regulation on sanitary requirements concerning contagious animal 
diseases (Wijziging Regeling inzake hygiëne-voorschriften besmettelijke dierziekten) of 5 July 1999, 
Staatscourant 1999 (125: 5 July): 8. 
39  Currently, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. 
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Environmental Quality and Health). This department was also responsible for further implementation 
of the new policy.40 
 The domestic actors in the Netherlands preferred stricter regulation than provided by the directive. 
Especially in view of the outbreak of swine fever, which forced the ministry to impose severe 
restrictions on the transport and handling of swine, it was, as one government official commented, 
“…not the time for a minimal implementation of the directive.” The directive also allowed for some 
leeway. A frequent use of words like ‘appropriate’, ‘sufficient’, ‘at least’, and ‘if necessary’ permitted 
national interpretation of various aspects of the directive, especially concerning the conditions of 
assembly centers and the premises of animal dealers, and the cleaning of trucks. In terms of the 
analytical framework of this paper, there existed a considerable set of sustainable proposals, which is 
illustrated in Figure 7. The minister as well as the policy department preferred a higher level of 
prevention than could be based on the directive. In other words, their ideal positions were located to 
the left of strictest legally sustainable policy, which is indicated by dmax. The legal department held a 
more reserved position during the transposition process. Its ideal position was within the set of 
sustainable proposals and to the left of the directive. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 The preference configuration as illustrated in Figure 7 satisfies the conditions mentioned in 
Hypothesis 2-B. First, the policy specified in the directive is located to the right of the domestic 
players, that is, both departments within the ministry of agriculture and the minister. Second, the 
minister as the agenda setter in this process prefers a higher level of prevention, which is not part of 
the set of sustainable proposals and thus the set of feasible policies. For this instance, the hypothesis 
predicts that the outcome is the policy equivalent to the feasible policy closest to the most preferred 
                                                     
40  Currently this is the Department of Food Quality and Animal Health. 
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position of the agenda setter. Since the minister as the agenda setter is located to the right of strictest 
feasible policy, that is, policy dmax, this policy is expected to be selected.  
 With the adoption of three ministerial decrees, the Dutch introduced a strict level of regulation, 
which stretched the rules laid down in the directive as much as possible. The new rules, which were 
intended for trade between member states, also applied the trade of swine and bovine animals within 
the Netherlands. In addition, stricter rules were introduced concerning the cleaning and disinfection of 
assembly centers and trucks (from 50 kilometers on), the separation of different herds on the premises 
of animal dealers, and a ban on bringing together animals that did not come from ‘primary’ holdings.  
 In the case of the ministerial decree on sanitary requirements, the Dutch even adopted too stringent 
an interpretation on the cleaning of trucks carrying swine and bovine animals coming from other 
member states. The European Commission commented that these rules had to be changed so that 
trucks that were sufficiently cleaned and disinfected in another member state did not need to be 
disinfected again upon arrival in the Netherlands.41 
 The prediction based on Hypothesis 2-B is confirmed by the new rules introduced by the three 
decrees adopted in the Netherlands. The ministry achieved the highest level of protection that was 
allowed under the amended Directive 64/432/EEC. Still, most domestic veto players were not satisfied. 
As Figure 7 illustrates, both the minister and the policy department preferred an even higher level of 
regulation in order to avoid the spreading of contagious animal diseases. During the transposition 
process, the ministry already prepared the two additional measures, which were intended to replace 
two of the three ministerial decrees. These two measures proposed stricter regulatory regimes for the 
                                                     
41  See the Ministerial Decree amending the Regulation on sanitary requirements concerning 
contagious animal diseases (Wijziging Regeling inzake hygiëne-voorschriften besmettelijke dierziekten) 
of 12 July 1999, Staatscourant 1999 (136: 20 July): 5. Based on a notification procedure with regard to 
the original regulation, the European Commission indicated that the Netherlands could not set 
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Netherlands than were possible under the directive. The government had to notify the European 
Commission of both measures.42 After the notification procedure, which led to some changes in these 
measures based on comments by the Commission, two new measures for swine and bovine animals 
were adopted in July 2000 and July 2001, respectively. These new measures mark a further shift of the 
Dutch regulatory regime towards a high level of prevention under close EU supervision. 
 This case breaks with the suggestion in the literature that national legislative actors are the relevant 
veto players. Nor parliament or any of the political parties were relevant in deciding on the national 
legal measures transposing the animal trade directive. In this case administrative players determined 
transposition. Furthermore, these administrative players had quite some impact on the final outcome. 
Although their number is almost the same as in the case of the tobacco products directive, the outcome 
of the transposition of the directive is very different. Instead of transposing the directive literally, the 
minister together with the judicial and policy departments of the ministry agreed to a stricter 
interpretation. While the number of players appears to be irrelevant, what matters is that these players 
preferred changing the provisions of the directive towards a stricter regulatory framework. This led to 
the adoption of a domestic policy that differs from a literal interpretation of the directive. 
Conclusions  
This paper proposed a policy-specific approach to the transposition of EU directives into national law. 
According to this approach, transposition takes place in various domestic arenas varying from national 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
additional requirements to transports from other EU member states that satisfy Article 12 of Directive 
65/432/EEC. 
42  See Ministerial Decree on the grouping of animals (Regeling betreffende het bijeenbrengen van 
dieren 2000) of 23 June 2000, Staatscourant 2000 (121: 27 June): 12, which concerns the handling and 
trade of swine. This measure was notified to the European Commission on 8 September 1998 and 
came into force on 1 July 2000. See also the Ministerial Decree amending the regulation on the trade 
in live animals and live products (Wijziging Regeling handel in levende dieren en levende producten) 
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lawmaking to decision making within ministries or administrative bodies. Depending on these arenas, 
the framework developed in this paper shows that domestic actors may react differently to the 
requirement of transposing a directive. 
 A first response is for domestic actors to keep to a literal interpretation of a directive, as in the case 
of the tobacco products directive. This response is a result of opposing veto players who obstruct a 
discussion on how national rules can be adapted to domestic demands. In the case of tobacco, the 
governing parties preferred a less strict interpretation of the directive than the minister of health. As a 
consequence, the minister stuck to the wording of the directive on the use of different color fields on 
the packaging of tobacco products and no longer supported the deviating interpretation introduced by 
his predecessor.  
 A second response is for domestic actors to adopt a different interpretation of the directive, as in the 
case of animal trade directive. Both the minister of agriculture and the departments within the ministry 
preferred a stricter interpretation of the directive in order to prevent the spreading of contagious animal 
diseases. Their agreement about how to transpose the directive resulted in the adoption of strict rules 
on the transport and handling of swine within the boundaries of Commission oversight. Since their 
interpretation was not challenged by the European Commission, it remained the basis of the national 
policy based on the EU directive. Both cases analyzed in this paper confirm the predictions based on 
the hypotheses developed using the framework of policy-specific veto players.  
 The developed framework identifies the conditions under which these distinct domestic responses 
to EU directives are expected. Literal transposition is the consequence of mutually divided domestic 
actors, while different national interpretations arise when all relevant domestic actors jointly prefer a 
change of EU policy. The extent to which deviations are possible is further shaped by the preferences 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of 5 March 2001, Staatscourant 2001 (46: 6 March): 8. This measure concerns the handling and trade 
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of these actors, differences in policymaking authority among these actors, and the leeway that is 
permitted by the European Commission’s review of national implementing measures.  
 The analysis presents a contrasting view on how European policy is transformed in the national 
political arena than the one proposed by Börzel and Risse (2000: 7).43 Following a rational choice 
argument, they suggest that “[t]he more power is dispersed across the political system and the more 
actors have a say in political decision-making, the more difficult it is to foster the domestic consensus 
or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to introduce changes in response to Europeanization pressures.” This 
hypothesis is based on the number of domestic actors involved, which is seen as a function of the 
distribution of power within a political system. It suggests that the participation of a large number of 
domestic actors leads to an inability to adapt to EU law. The hypotheses developed in this paper, 
however, point to other explanatory factors and predicted effects. First, the preference configuration of 
actors is important and not just their number. Clearly, if all actors would prefer the same policy, their 
number is irrelevant. Second, in the case of transposition, decision making is about changes in the 
national legal order and not about the adoption of the directive (which was the topic of the preceding 
legislative process at the EU level). Since directives must be transposed, domestic actors can only 
adjust the policy to national circumstances. Consequently, fostering domestic consensus will have a 
different impact. If domestic actors are unable to reach consensus, a literal transposition of the 
directive is the only way. At the same time, this process may be hindered by opposing actors thus 
leading to delay. However, if domestic agreement or consensus exists, national actors adopt, within 
certain margins, an interpretation of the directive. Domestic consensus enables deviations from the 
agreed European policy instead of literal implementation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of cows. It was notified to the Commission 10 September 1999 and came into force on 1 July 2001. 
43  Similar claims are made by others as well; see, for instance, Falkner et al. (2004: 466). 
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 The framework presented in this paper also points to the importance of the interplay between veto-
power and preferences. The interaction of policymaking power and preferences is often neglected in 
the literature, especially in empirical work that takes ‘the number of veto players’ as a valid indicator 
of rationalist explanations of compliance (see Mbaye, 2001, 2003; Giulliani, 2003a, 2003b). Only if 
the views of veto players are far apart and widely dispersed over the political spectrum, is veto power 
important and will lead to effects similar to the ones discussed in this paper. However, if veto players 
hold similar views, their power becomes less important. In the extreme, if veto players have similar 
preferences, they act as if they are a single player. 
 The empirical analysis in this paper shows that a variety of domestic actors can be regarded as the 
relevant veto players. In the case of the tobacco products directive, the minister and the governing 
parties in Dutch national parliament were the relevant veto players. This is somewhat similar to Treib’s 
claim that national political parties play an important role in transposition (Treib, 2003). However, the 
tobacco products directive required a change in the existing tobacco law by means of passing 
legislation in parliament. But not all directives require a change of statutory law. In the case of the 
animal trade directive, the required changes could be introduced by ministerial decree. Existing law 
allowed the minister of agriculture to decide on issues related to the prevention of contagious animal 
diseases without further involvement of parliament or the government. In contrast to the framework 
used by Treib and others in which national parties play a role, here the relevant veto players were 
administrative actors.44 
                                                     
44  These actors include cabinet ministers, who are ‘formally’ independent agents within the Dutch 
constitutional context. Although these ministers could be ‘controlled’ by the political party they 
suppose to represent, this informally shaped principal-agent relationship is affected by transaction 
costs as well as ambiguity due to the existence of multiple principals within the party leadership. A 
possible impact is expected on a limited range of issues, that is, those which are regarded as the main 
political priorities of the party. Preventing the spread of contagious animal diseases were not part of 
these priorities. 
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 The animal trade directive clearly illustrates the importance of national administrations in the 
transposition of EU directives. Deciding on how to interpret the directive in the Netherlands, the 
administrative players in the ministry of agriculture acted without any involvement or interference of 
the national parliament. Nor were the directive or the proposed and adopted rules discussed in 
parliament. The minister of agriculture decided on the new rules based on discussions between the 
legal and policy departments within the ministry. This example contradicts the view introduced in the 
first part of this paper that lower-level decisions are a reflection of the wishes of parliament (see, for 
instance, McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Weingast and Moran, 1983). Decisions on transposition are 
often solely taken within the national administration implying a more prominent role of these actors in 
national policymaking than the ‘Congressional dominance’ perspective suggests. 
 The analysis also sheds some light on delays in transposition. As indicated, opposing interests may 
hinder a swift decision-making process leading to the required adaptation of the national legal order. 
Although domestic actors have no other choice than to transpose the directive in a literal way, the 
process may take some time. Agreement, however, may lead to deviations from the directive, but may 
also provide the conditions for a speedy decision-making process. These conjectures are supported by 
the empirical analysis. The tobacco products directive required the member states to transpose the 
deadline in about 14 months, while the Dutch government took more than two years in order to 
complete this task. Opposing interests between the governing parties and the government played a role 
here. In addition, this directive needed to be transposed through new legislation, which required more 
time than lower-level legal instruments (see also Mastenbroek, 2003). The animal trade directive set a 
transposition period of about two years, including an extension granted to the member states by the 
Council of Ministers. The Dutch government completed the work a few days after the deadline. 
Agreement among the minister and the two relevant departments within the ministry of agriculture 
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made it possible to keep this deadline, despite the fact that these departments were overloaded due to 
the 1997 outbreak of swine fever.  
 In a more general way, the paper shows that European policymaking, to the extent that it concerns 
directives, does not end at the last stage of the legislative process in the Council of Ministers. After 
adoption, directives are further shaped by the member states when they are put into national rules. In 
this process, and within the limits of Commission oversight, domestic actors can adopt an 
interpretation that somewhat deviates from the directive. In this way, EU policymaking is best 
described as a long chain of mutually dependent decisions that cuts across multiple levels of 
government. Despite this complexity, the current literature on the EU tends to put a strong emphasis on 
the EU legislative stage in which policy is shaped by the interactions between the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament (see Steunenberg, 2000; Dowding, 2002). However, from a policy 
perspective, such a view is insufficient and does not show how the splendid ambitions formulated in 
Brussels are transformed and implemented in the national and sometimes regional and local 
administrations of the member states. The policy-specific approach proposed in this paper can help to 
disentangle and clarify these complex processes and their unexpected outcomes. 
Appendix 
Let i be a domestic veto player, i ∈ V, who has simple Euclidean and separable preferences for the 
outcome space R, which are defined by a utility function Ui(x), x ∈ R. The ideal position of this player 
is denoted as Vi. Let d be the policy specified in the directive, d ∈ R. Pi(d), or simply Pi, is the 
preference set of veto player i with regard to d, that is, Pi = {x| Ui(x) > Ui(d)}. Let W = ∩Pi be the win 
set of a group of veto players, i ∈ V ⊂ N, with regard to d. Finally, the oversight of the Commission of 
a member state’s compliance with directive d involves a policy-dependent (positive) cost, c ∈ R+. The 
Commission, which is assumed to prefer d, accepts the interpretation p when it is located between dmin 
= (d - ci) and dmax = (d + cj); costs may vary depending on the direction of interpretation (that is, for 
instance, lower or higher levels of regulation); define the set of sustainable policies as S = {x| x ≥ dmin 
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and x ≤ dmax}. Note that since c is not equal to zero, the set S always exists. The set of feasible policies 
can now be defined as F = S ∩ W. By definition, F = ∅ if and only if W = ∅. 
 The structure of the game is that: (1) a veto player with agenda setting power, a ∈ V, makes an offer 
to deviate from d, p ∈ R, to the other players; (2) the other veto players, i ∈ V-{a}, decide individually 
whether or to accept or reject the proposal; if they do not agree, d will be implemented; and (3) if the 
proposal is accepted by all, the Commission decides whether to challenge the interpretation of the 
directive (it does if p ∉ S).  
Hypothesis 1 
Define l as the left-most veto player, and r as the right-most one along some policy dimension R. 
Based on the sequence of play as described above, the veto players implement d if Vl ≤ d ≤ Vr. 
 Proof. The condition is sufficient: by assumption, the Commission as well as the directive d is 
located between veto players. Since veto player l prefers a change to the left, while veto player r 
prefers a change to the right, these players cannot agree on a new interpretation p and therefore have to 
accept the transposition of d. The condition is necessary: assume that d < Vl (the mirror case is if d 
>Vr, which I will no further discuss). Note that dmax is found to the right of d and thus allows for some 
change. In this case, like all other veto players, including r, veto player l prefers a change to the right 
(W = ∩Pi ≠ ∅). Since a win set exists, which, by definition, overlaps with the set of sustainable 
policies, all veto players accept a new interpretation p. This contradicts that no new interpretation is 
selected. 
Hypothesis 2 
Define i(d) as player i’s point of indifference with regard to d. Based on the sequence of play: 
 
(a) the veto players choose an interpretation p = Va if (i) d < Vl or d > Vr and (ii) Va ∈ F. 
 Proof. I focus on d < Vl (d > Vr is the mirror case for which the same logic applies). Both conditions 
are sufficient: by assumption, the directive d is located to the left of the veto players. Since all veto 
players prefer a change to the right, these players can agree on new interpretations, which are found in 
the set of feasible policies, F. In addition, since ideal position of the agenda setter is found in F, this 
player proposes p = Va, which is accepted by all other veto players and the Commission. Both 
conditions are necessary. Assume that d ≥ Vl,: l now prefers a change of d to the left and thus disagrees 
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with the other players, including r, on a new interpretation. So d is implemented, which contradicts 
that a new interpretation is chosen. Assume that Va ∉ F: the agenda setter, a, cannot select his or her 
most preferred position since this position is not part of the set of feasible interpretations. This 
contradicts that the new interpretation is equal to a’s most preferred position. 
 
(b) the veto players choose an interpretation p = min{dmax, l(d)} if (i) d < Vl and (ii) Va ∉ F; or p = 
max{dmin, r(d)} if (i) d >Vr and (ii) Va ∉ F. 
 Proof. Again I focus on d < Vl . Both conditions are sufficient: see also before. Since the ideal 
position of the agenda setter, Va, is not found in F, this player proposes the feasible interpretation that 
is closest to his or her ideal position. The relevant endpoint of F is either the highest value of S (i.e. 
dmax) or the highest value of W (i.e. l(d)) depending on which of the two values is smallest. 
Consequently, the agenda setter chooses interpretation min{dmax, l(d)}, which is accepted by the other 
players and the Commission. Both conditions are necessary. See before. Now assume that Va ∈ F: the 
agenda setter, a, can select his or her most preferred position since this position is part of the set of 
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Spain  2428 2414 14 0.6% 
Denmark  2413 2392 21 0.9% 
Finland  2406 2383 23 1.0% 
Ireland  2424 2398 26 1.1% 
UK  2407 2379 28 1.2% 
Portugal  2449 2418 31 1.3% 
Austria  2413 2373 40 1.7% 
Sweden  2395 2354 41 1.7% 
Belgium  2465 2415 50 2.0% 
Netherlands  2412 2359 53 2.2% 
Germany  2411 2357 54 2.2% 
Luxembourg  2414 2355 59 2.4% 
France  2411 2349 62 2.6% 
Italy  2419 2355 64 2.6% 
Greece  2414 2346 68 2.8% 
Mean 2419 2376 42 1.7% 
Source: number of applicable and transposed directives from Secretariat General, 
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Figure 4: Transposition of Directive 2001/37/EC in the Netherlands 
 
 
Existing Tobacco Law 
National law: Lower-level legal instruments: 2001/37/EC 
in force: 
18.7.2001 Decision of 21 January 2002 changing the Decision tar yield 
cigarettes (Besluit teergehalte sigaretten) and the Decision 
labeling tobacco products (Aanduidingsbesluit tabaksproducten) 
 
 
 Publication: 19 February 2002 
 In force: 1 May 2002 
 
 
 Ministerial Decree on measurement methods on tar, nicotine and 
carbon monoxide of cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco 
(Regeling methoden van onderzoek ten aanzien van teer-, 




 Publication: 23 April 2002 
 In force: 1 May 2002 
deadline: 
30.9.2002 
 Amendment of the Tobacco Law Ministerial Decree on list of ingredients of tobacco products 
(Regeling lijsten tabaksingrediënten)  Publication: 4 March 2003 
 Publication: 24 April 2003 In force: 18 April 2003 
 In force: 26 April 2003 
 
 
 Decision of 13 May 2003 changing the Appendix of the Tobacco 




completion: Publication: 3 June 2003 
1.9.2003 In force: 1 September 2003 
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Figure 5: Preferences of the veto players on the transposition of Directive 2001/37/EC 
A: period 2001-July 2002 (cabinet Kok II) 
B: period after July 2002 (cabine
less restrictions on 
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Figure 6: Transposition of Directive 97/12/EC in the Netherlands: 
Articles 11, 12 and 13 of Directive 64/432/EEC 
 
 
National Lower-level legal instruments:97/12/EC Transposing 
the article of in force: 
25.4.1997 64/432/EC: Ministerial Decree amending the Regulation on the grouping of 
animals and the Regulation on the trade in live animals and live 
products (Wijziging Regeling bijeenbrengen van dieren en 








  Publication: 7 August 1998  
  In force: 9 August 1998 
initial  
deadline:  
1.7.1998  Ministerial Decree amending the regulation on the trade in live 
animals and live products (Wijziging Regeling handel in levende 
dieren en levende producten)** 
  
98/99/EC 11, 12, 13 
new 
deadline: 
 Publication: 30 June 1999 
 In force: 1 July 1999 
1.7.1999  
  
  Ministerial Decree amending the regulation on sanitary 
requirements concerning contagious animal diseases (Wijziging 
Regeling inzake hygiëne-voorschriften besmettelijke dierziekten) 




 6.7.1999 In force: 6 July 1999 
* After notification replaced by Ministerial Decree on the grouping of animals (Regeling betreffende het bijeenbrengen van dieren 
2000) of 23 June 2000. 
** After notification replaced by Ministerial Decree amending the regulation on the trade in live animals and live products 






Figure 7: Preferences of the veto players on the transposition of Directive 97/12/EC amending Directive 
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